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The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:
The Unnecessarily Broad Impact of
Qui Tam Civil False Claims Act Cases
on Rural Health Care Providers
Andrew M. Hyer†
Abstract
The civil False Claims Act (FCA) imposes harsh penalties against
parties who misappropriate federal funds. The statute’s qui tam whistleblower provisions create strong financial incentives for private
individuals to bring and pursue FCA cases against health providers on
the government’s behalf—even where government attorneys decline to
intervene. FCA cases where the government declined to intervene
account for less than 2 percent of all recoveries in health care FCA cases.
Yet the costs of defending such cases may be very high, especially for
rural providers with small operating margins. Federal provider selfreferral and anti-kickback laws carve out various exceptions to support
the financial viability of rural providers. The FCA, however, contains no
such exceptions. Although Department of Justice (DOJ) policy directs
officials to take into account community access to care in pursuing FCA
cases against rural providers, the ability for private whistleblowers to
pursue cases where the government declines to intervene undermines the
DOJ’s ability to achieve that aim. This Article highlights the liability
risks rural providers commonly face under the FCA and argues for
amending the FCA to allow a whistleblower claim to proceed against
providers serving designated underserved areas only where government
authorities intervene in the case.
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Introduction
Over the years, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) has led to various
highly publicized, billion-dollar settlements against large pharmaceutical
companies and hospital systems.1 Despite this apparent focus on larger
entities by federal health care fraud enforcement authorities, small rural
providers are not immune from becoming entangled in expensive and
protracted civil FCA litigation. This is especially true in light of the fact
that federal FCA claims can be initiated and pursued solely by private
whistleblowers independent of action by a government agency.
Although lawmakers and agencies have created various legislative
and regulatory exceptions aimed at easing administrative burdens and
costs for rural providers working in underserved communities, lawmakers
have not created similar exceptions for FCA whistleblower claims. Most
problematic is the fact that a whistleblower may unilaterally pursue such
a claim on the government’s behalf even if governmental authorities do
not see cause to pursue one—or are opposed to doing so. Such a situation
arguably runs counter to various policy efforts to maintain the financial
viability of critical access providers in underserved areas. This Article
highlights the potential risks that rural providers face under the FCA
and discusses whether, as a matter of public policy, Congress should
reassess broad application of the FCA’s whistleblower provisions to rural
providers in underserved areas. Although this Article’s primary focus is
to show the need for a change in the FCA’s whistleblower provisions to
protect the financial viability of health practice in underserved rural
areas, it will also assist rural providers seeking to understand potential
liability under the FCA.

1.

See, e.g., Dinesh Kumar, Note, Adverse Events: Ethical Issues in the
Prosecution of Qui Tam Health Care Fraud Cases under the False Claims
Act, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 661, 666 tbl. 1 (2012) (discussing major
FCA recoveries in recent years); Evan Perez, Lawsuits Bring in $3 Billion
for U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, at A4; Duff Wilson, Novartis Settles
Off-Label Marketing Case Over 6 Drugs for $422.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2010, at B5.
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Part I provides a brief overview of the FCA and its whistleblower
provisions as applied to the health care industry. It highlights how FCA
claims may be brought and pursued solely by a private whistleblower
even where government authorities choose not to intervene and explains
why this practice is problematic for rural providers. Part II discusses
rural health care and the various federal laws and programs designed to
make practicing in underserved rural areas more financially viable. Part
III argues that policymakers should consider amending the FCA to allow
whistleblower claims to proceed against certain rural providers only if
government authorities choose intervene in the case.

I.

The False Claims Act, Whistleblower Provisions,
and Rural Health Care Providers

The FCA and its whistleblower provisions were enacted in the wake
of the Civil War to address concerns of rampant fraud perpetrated by
government contractors during Reconstruction.2 The policy behind the
FCA is to create strict penalties for those who misappropriate government funds.3 To encourage those with “insider information” of fraudulent
activities to come forward, the FCA contains whistleblower provisions
allowing a private citizen to bring an FCA claim on the government’s
behalf and receive a portion of the money recovered through that
action.4
After significant amendments to the FCA in 1986, federal authorities
and private whistleblowers began applying the statute to the health care

2.

See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696–98 (1863); see also
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 781
(2000) (“[T]he FCA was enacted in 1863 with the principal goal of
‘stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large [private] contractors
during the Civil War.’”) (quoting United States v. Borstein, 423 U.S. 303,
309 (1976)); see also United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958);
Robert Salcido, The Government’s Increasing Use of the False Claims Act
Against the Health Care Industry, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 457, 460 (2003).

3.

See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A
Civil War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 461
(1998) (noting that the FCA’s primary purposes are: “(1) protecting the
public fisc and the integrity of federal programs by deterring the
submission of false or fraudulent claims, (2) securing restitution of
government losses by fraud, and (3) punishing those who defraud the
government”); see also Thomas F. O’Neill III, et al., The Buck Stops Here:
Preemption of Third-Party Claims by the False Claims Act, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 41, 43 (1995).

4.

37 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2011). Depending on the value of the whistleblower’s
contribution to the case and whether the government joins in the case, a
whistleblower is entitled to 10–30 percent of the government’s recovery.
§ 3730(d)(1)–(2). A prevailing whistleblower is entitled to an additional
award of his or her attorney’s fees. § 3730(d)(4).
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industry.5 One commentator notes that after these 1986 amendments,
“the FCA now lies at the heart of the federal government’s war on
healthcare fraud.”6 Between 1987 and 2011, settlements and judgments
in health care-related FCA actions totaled approximately $21 billion.7
The FCA’s scope and its whistleblower provisions were further broadened as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of
20098 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.9
A.

Current Application of the FCA to the Health Care Industry

As amended, an individual or organization violates the FCA by
“knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment” with federal funds.10 A violator can be held
liable for up to three times the actual monetary damages incurred by the
government and $5000 to $10,000 per false claim.11 Additionally, the
defendant is required to pay a prevailing whistleblower’s attorney’s

5.

See David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New
Firepower Is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127, 129–
30 (1995) (discussing the 1986 amendments and subsequent increase in use
of the FCA in the health arena).

6.

Joan H. Krause, Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the Lens of the
Civil False Claims Act, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 13, 13 (2010).

7.

CIVIL DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_
FCA_Statistics.pdf.

8.

111 Pub. L. No. 21, 123, § 4(a), Stat. 1617 (2009). Among other
amendments made by FERA, the definition of the term “claim” was
broadened to apply to situations where a subcontractor presents false
claims to a private primary contractor with no intent or even knowledge
that the claim would result in the government over-paying the primary
contractor. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2011) (defining the term “claim”
to include a request for money “made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient” where the original source of the money is the federal
government). This amendment effectively overruled the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of FERA’s prior definition of “claim” in Allison
Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, wherein the Court held that
FERA requires “the defendant to intend that a claim be ‘paid . . . by the
Government’ and not by another entity.” 553 U.S. 662, 670 (2008).

9.

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901 (2010).

10.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2011).

11.

Id. § 3729(a)(1). FERA has a provision limiting liability to “not less than 2
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains” if the
defendant fully cooperates in the investigation. Id. § 3729(a)(2)(B). As
explained below, however, because FCA cases against health care providers
almost never go to trial damages are very rarely assessed by a court.
Accordingly, this “reduced damages” amendment may have only a
negligible impact on the outcome of future FCA cases.
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fees.12 Defendants in civil FCA cases may be named as defendants in
parallel administrative and criminal proceedings, and any health care
provider found liable under the FCA faces potential exclusion from all
federal health programs (namely Medicare and Medicaid).13
The FCA casts a broad net as to the types of conduct potentially in
violation of the statute. It expansively defines the term “knowingly” to
include not only “actual knowledge” of the false statements but also acts
made in “deliberate ignorance” or in “reckless disregard” of the information’s truth or falsity.14 The statute’s definition of “knowingly”
clarifies that the FCA is violated even where there is “no proof of
specific intent to defraud” the government.15 As one court explained,
Congress defined knowledge broadly “to reach what has become known
as the ostrich type situation where an individual has buried his head in
the sand and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert him that
false claims are being submitted.”16
Under this broad definition of knowledge, Medicaid and Medicare
providers can be held liable under the FCA for not only willful fraudulent
billing but also for sloppy billing or a failure to supervise and train billing
staff if such conduct rises to the level of “reckless disregard.” Additionally,
under FERA, a failure to timely return to the government any overpayments may also give rise to FCA liability.17
12.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2011). Under this statute, a whistleblower may
recover attorney’s fees and costs if the defendant is found liable or makes a
payment to settle the case. See id. (stating that a whistleblower is entitled
to a portion “of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim” and
that “[a]ny such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable
expenses which the courts finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs”).

13.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6) (2011) (setting forth discretionary authority to
exclude providers found liable under FCA from participation in federal
health programs). As one commentator explains, “exclusion is tantamount
to an economic death penalty, because few providers can survive without
the ability to receive revenues associated with the care of Medicare and
Medicaid patients.” Robert B. Ramsey, III, Corporate Integrity
Agreements: Making the Best of a Tough Situation, HEALTHCARE
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Mar. 2002, at 58.

14.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A).

15.

Id. §3729(b)(1)(B).

16.

Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992).

17.

Industry commentaries reflect concern that this additional provision may
increase the potential for FCA liability. Robert C. Blume & Andrew S.
Tulumello, President Obama Signs Legislation Significantly Expanding the
Scope of the False Claims Act, GIBSON DUNN (May 26, 2009),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/PresidentObamaLegislation
ExpandsScope-FalseClaimsAct.aspx (noting that this amendment “opens up
new avenues of exposure against federal contractors or grantees for
knowingly retaining government ‘overpayments’”). See also Mark Taylor,
Feds Refocus on Fraud: Hospitals Must Ramp Up Compliance Programs to
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From the perspective of a provider seeking to avoid potential FCA
issues, these consequences point to the need to have and implement an
effective compliance program and to have properly qualified health
information management and compliance professionals overseeing the
billing process.18 Such preventative measures minimize the occurrence of
erroneous overpayments, better assure that overpayments are promptly
returned, and help prove that the provider was not acting with “reckless
disregard” in the event of an FCA claim. Because of the importance of
employing well-trained compliance and billing individuals to avoid FCA
liability, the shortage of technically qualified professionals in many rural
areas may pose a problem for providers in those areas.19
If an FCA claim is brought against a provider, the statute’s broad
definition of “knowingly” makes defending and resolving the case
complicated and expensive for the defendant provider. In a traditional
common law fraud claim, a defendant could have the case dismissed in
the pretrial phase unless the plaintiff offers evidence that the defendant
had a knowing and willful intent to defraud.20 Under the FCA, however,
there is room for a fact-intensive inquiry into the gray area between
what constitutes negligent billing mistakes and errors arising out of
Meet New Provisions, TRUSTEE, Feb. 2011, at 20 (quoting health attorney
Robert Homchick that this amendment “increases the stakes in how
hospitals will deal with what they uncover during their compliance reviews,
audits or something that surfaces in the ordinary course of business”).
18.

Taylor, supra note 17, at 17.

19.

See Charles W. Fluharty, Refrain or Reality: A United States Rural
Policy?: Implications for Rural Health Care, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 57, 64
(2002) (“[F]ewer young adults in rural areas seek post-secondary education,
have college degrees, or have no high school diplomas . . . .”); COMM. ON
THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH CARE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
QUALITY THROUGH COLLABORATION: THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH 79
(2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11140
(“For decades, rural and frontier communities have struggled to attract and
retain an adequate supply of the various health care professionals . . . .”).
Demand for health information management professionals involved with
billing and compliance in rural areas is expected to increase in coming
years. See Candi Helseth, HIT Workforce a Growing Concern for Critical
Access Hospitals, RURAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://www.raconline.org/
newsletter/spring12/feature.php#story2 (last updated Apr. 24, 2012)
(“Primary care workforce shortages are a given in rural health care. Now
rural providers—particularly in Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs)—are
facing another daunting workforce shortage: technology professionals in
high demand and short supply.”).

20.

See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit to Fraudulent Conveyances and
Transfers § 23 (2001) (“The five traditional elements of fraud, each of
which must be established by evidence that is not equally consistent with
either honesty or deceit include: a false representation; in reference to a
material fact; made with knowledge of its falsity; with the intent to
deceive; and on which an action is taken in justifiable reliance upon the
representation.”).
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“willful ignorance” or “reckless disregard.” As such, it is more difficult
for a defendant in an FCA case—even one who would probably not be
found liable at trial—to convince a court to dismiss the case in the
pretrial phase. Moreover, considering the high penalties and damages
associated with liability under the FCA, the potential for exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid, and the high litigation costs involved in pursuing a complex claim, often the only realistic option for an FCA
defendant is to settle.21 Thus, even if a defendant has a strong defense
and plausible odds of prevailing at trial, the potential consequences of
losing may be too great to risk. Some commentators suggest that the
fact that such defenses are never presented at trial emboldens whistleblowers’ attorneys and government authorities to seek unreasonably high
settlements in cases with relatively weak evidence and untested legal
theories.22 As explained below, such a situation may be particularly
problematic where authorities opt not to intervene in a case, and a
whistleblower unilaterally pursues an FCA settlement against a critical
access provider in an underserved rural area.
B.

FCA Cases Pursued Unilaterally by Whistleblowers

FCA cases may be initiated by the government or a private whistleblower with insider information. Actions brought by whistleblowers are
commonly referred to as qui tam cases.23 The vast majority of FCA
matters in the health care arena somehow involve a qui tam whistleblower.24 For example, during the first three quarters of 2011, the
Department of Justice reported 417 new FCA matters involving federal

21.

Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 276 (2004) (“Given the balance of power, it
should come as no surprise that prosecutors have the power to ‘encourage’
settlements, even where abstract legal analysis might favor the
defendant.”).

22.

See Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal
Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the
Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 625, 651 (2007)
(“[I]t is nearly inevitable that a health care provider accused of wrongdoing
will settle a civil or criminal suit, because the risks involved in proceeding
to trial are far too high and may jeopardize the provider’s very
existence.”); Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc:
Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36. GA.
L. REV. 121, 127 (2001) (“Within the industry, there is a growing concern
that the Act’s enormous penalties may force health care providers to settle
cases that could not be proven in court, such as allegations of falsity
stemming from good faith interpretations of ambiguous regulations.”).

23.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2011). The language of the FCA refers to the
whistleblower as the qui tam plaintiff. Courts frequently refer to the
whistleblower as the “relator.”

24.

See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 7.
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health programs where a whistleblower was involved and only thirtyseven where a whistleblower was not involved.25
Because schemes to defraud the government may be difficult to detect
by authorities, the FCA’s whistleblower provisions have been crafted to
create strong financial incentives for a private individual with insider
information to come forward.26 Successful whistleblowers are entitled to
10 to 30 percent of the government’s total recovery and a separate
award of attorney’s fees.27 To sustain a qui tam claim under the FCA,
the whistleblower must be the “original source” of information that has
not previously been “publicly disclosed.”28 The Department of Health &
Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS OIG) explains
that “[w]histleblowers could be current or ex-business partners, hospital
or office staff, patients, or competitors.”29
A whistleblower alleging a violation of the FCA brings a claim by
filing a complaint under seal.30 The complaint remains under seal for
sixty days or longer while the government investigates the case and
determines whether it will intervene.31 If the government intervenes, the
whistleblower’s attorneys and the government’s attorneys will pursue the
case together.32 If the government chooses not to intervene, the whistleblower’s attorneys may pursue the case on their own.33 Although the
DOJ does not publish data on the proportion of qui tam cases in which

25.

Id. Between 1987 and 2011, there were a total of 4365 qui tam cases,
compared to only 727 non-qui tam. Id.

26.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006); see also Brian G. Santo, The False Claims
Act: Analysis of the Recently Expanded Legislation on Qui Tam Actions
and Related Impact on Whistleblowers, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE,
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource
_home/Volume6_SE2_Santo.html (last updated July 22, 2010)
(explaining that the FCA “was established to elicit help from private
citizens to fight fraud, permitting people to sue in the name of the United
States and collect a portion of the recovery the government obtains”).

27.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).

28.

Id. § 3730(e). The PPACA amended the statute’s definition of “original
source” to broaden and clarify the type of information a whistleblower may
contribute in order to bring a suit under the FCA’s qui tam whistleblower
provisions. See Santo, supra note 26.

29.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, A ROADMAP FOR NEW PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 3, http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physicianeducation/roadmap_web_version.pdf (last visited June 3, 2013) [hereinafter
OIG ROADMAP].

30.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).

31.

Id. § 3730(b)(2)–(3).

32.

Kumar, supra note 1, at 663–64.

33.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(c).
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it intervenes,34 it does report the annual amounts recovered through qui
tam cases based on whether the government intervened. Between 1987
and 2011, the total recovery in cases where the government chose not to
intervene was a small fraction—only 2.3 percent—of the government’s
total recoveries in health care qui tam cases.35 If one includes the amount
the government has recovered in health care FCA cases not involving a
whistleblower, cases in which the government has not intervened account
for only 1.7 percent of the FCA recoveries in the health arena since
1987.36 Accordingly, it is apparent that qui tam cases in which the
government has not intervened play, in relative terms, a very small role
in recovering fraudulently obtained governmental funds.
Although, in terms of amounts recovered, qui tam cases where the
government has not intervened are fairly insignificant, such cases may
still be quite expensive for a health care provider to defend. Moreover,
professional malpractice liability insurance policies likely will not cover
FCA liability under most circumstances,37 so providers must pay defense
costs out-of-pocket or have another type of insurance coverage. And
although some types of Directors and Officers Liability insurance policies
may cover civil FCA liability and legal defense costs,38 other policies
contain standard exclusions that may “have profound and often unanticipated consequences in the context of FCA claims.”39 To the extent
insurance coverage may be available for FCA-related issues in a Directors
and Officers policy, obtaining such coverage may require strict adherence
to insurer notice requirements and involve a legal dispute with the
insurance carrier.40 Finally, although some insurance carriers offer
34.

See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 7.

35.

Id. From 1987 to 2011, the government recovered a total of approximately
$15.8 billion in qui tam health care cases; of this amount, approximately
$15.5 billion was recovered in cases where the government intervened. Id.

36.

Id. The DOJ reports recovering approximately $5.15 billion in civil health
fraud cases not involving a qui tam relator between 1987 and 2011. Id.

37.

See, e.g., Zurich American Ins. Co. v. O’Hara Regional Centers for
Rehabilitation, 529 F.3d 916, 918–20 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
“acts or omissions” provision in a professional liability insurance policy
does not cover FCA liability, even where FCA liability is premised upon
the argument that the provider wrongfully billed for substandard care).
For helpful discussions on the potential for FCA liability based on
providing (and then billing the government for) substandard care, see
United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152–53
(W.D. Mo. 2000).

38.

Stephen T. Raptis, Surviving False Claims Act Allegations: What Every
Government Contractor Needs to Know to Maximize Insurance Coverage,
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, Apr. 2012, at 59.

39.

Id.

40.

See id. at 63 (noting that insurance “policy language is subject to legal
interpretation”).
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policies directly related to FCA and other false claim-related issues,41
purchasing such coverage may be unduly costly for rural providers.
In short, while the potential financial exposure associated with
defending FCA cases is significant for any health care provider participating in federal programs,42 such exposure may be particularly
problematic for less sophisticated rural providers with tight operating
budgets. DOJ internal policy accordingly directs its attorneys to consider
the potential effects of a lawsuit on the community’s access to care:
When dealing with rural and community hospitals and other health
care providers, Department attorneys shall consider the impact an
action may have on the community being served. In determining an
appropriate resolution, or deciding whether to bring an action, care
must be taken to consider the community’s interest in access to
adequate health care along with any other relevant concerns.43

In dealing with a provider who is vital to the community, and where the
alleged conduct is not egregious,44 DOJ attorneys may properly decide to
forgo a claim. A whistleblower pursuing a case unilaterally, however, is
not required to take such factors into account. To the contrary, the
whistleblower has strong financial incentives to obtain a substantial
recovery regardless of the impact it may have on a rural provider’s
financial viability and the community’s access to care.
If a health care provider was to prevail in an FCA case brought
unilaterally by a whistleblower, the FCA provides a narrow remedy for
the provider to recover attorney’s fees upon a showing that the lawsuit
was “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
41.

See, e.g., Physician Regulatory Insurance/RAC Audit Insurance,
GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE, http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/products/
fraud-abuse/ (last visited May 3, 2013) (advertising insurance products
specifically addressed to FCA liability).

42.

See Pamela H. Bucy, The Path from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching
Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 40–42 (2000) (discussing the financial
burden health care fraud investigations potentially create for teaching
hospitals).

43.

Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys et al. (June 3, 1998), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/chcm.htm.

44.

For example, a health care provider may face potential FCA liability for
the wrongful conduct of another entity or individual with whom it
contracts—even if the provider itself has done nothing wrong. See The
Heart Doctors v. Layne, No. 6:05-636, 2006 WL 2692694, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
Sept. 13, 2006); Keely E. Duke & Andrew M. Hyer, Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Limitations on a Health Care Provider’s Right to
Indemnification when It Is Targeted Under the False Claims Act as a
Result of the Fraudulent Activities of a Third Party with Which It
Contracts or Associates, FEDERAL LAWYER, Feb. 2009, at 28.

468

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

purposes of harassment.”45 Under this stringent standard, an award of
attorney’s fees is only awarded to a prevailing defendant. As mentioned
above, the high defense costs and potentials for high damages and
exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid leave most
defendants with no option but to settle if the defendant cannot obtain a
dismissal in the pretrial stage. And even if a defendant were to prevail,
it must also show that the lawsuit was frivolous, vexatious, or brought
for harassment.46 This sets a high bar,47 and courts will refuse to award
attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in the absence of “clear” evidence of this type of conduct.48

II. Rural Health and Rural Providers
Although all health care providers that accept any form of governmental funding should be aware of the potential risk of FCA liability,
the cost and expense of defending a whistleblower FCA claim may be
particularly onerous for some rural providers. As illustrated below, a
general goal of many government programs and policies is to promote
the financial viability of providers in underserved rural areas. Accordingly,
this Section first provides an overview of the status of heath care in rural
America and the characteristics of rural providers. It then explains
provider shortage designations used by federal agencies and the major
policies and laws intended to increase the attractiveness and viability of
practicing in underserved rural areas.
A.

Rural Health in the United States

For reasons related to both patient demographic characteristics and
lack of access to care, rural populations in the United States often suffer

45.

31 U.S.C.§ 3730(d)(4) (2006).

46.

Id.

47.

See United States ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Cont’l Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869,
875 (5th Cir. 2008) (“An action is not frivolous if existing law or a
reasonable suggestion for its extension, modification, or reversal supports
the action.”).

48.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Solutions, 650 F.3d 445,
458 (4th Cir. 2011) (reversing trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to
prevailing FCA defendant under abuse of discretion standard, reasoning
that the relator’s FCA claims “objectively” had some “reasonable chance of
success”); Rafizadeh, 553 F.3d at 875 (upholding district court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees on the basis that the relator’s suit
was not “clearly vexatious”). But see Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337
(4th Cir. 2009) (upholding award of attorney’s fees to prevailing FCA
defendant where relator’s action was jurisdictionally barred because the
information had been publically disclosed and he was not the original
source of the information).
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worse health outcomes than populations in other parts of the country.49
Compared to populations in more urban areas, those in rural areas are
generally older, have lower education levels, lower income, and must
travel greater distances to obtain health care.50 Rural residents are also
more likely to be in fair or poor health and have chronic conditions.51 In
light of these factors, in creating the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) in 1999, Congress identified “the delivery of health
care in . . . rural areas (including frontier areas)” as an area of concern.52
Each year, AHRQ produces an annual report tracking health disparities
among individuals from various underserved or vulnerable “priority
populations,” which includes individuals residing in rural areas.53 Rural
areas face significant challenges because of financial difficulties and a
shortage of qualified professionals. Only 11.4 percent of physicians in the
United States practice in rural areas despite 19.2 percent of the population living in those areas.54 Nationwide health data from 2004–2008
reveals that residents of nonmetropolitan areas had higher inpatient
heart attack mortality rates than residents of large fringe metropolitan
areas.55 In 2005, nonmetropolitan areas of the country had an ageadjusted mortality rate of approximately eighty deaths higher per
100,000 people than in metropolitan areas.56 Similarly, in 2000, approximately 20.5 percent of the population aged 16–64 in nonmetropolitan
areas reported having a disability in contrast to the metropolitan
percentage of 18.2 percent.57
49.

See LEIYU SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, DELIVERING HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 440 (5th ed. 2012) (“Access to health care
[in rural areas] is affected by poverty, long distances, rural topography,
weather conditions, and limited availability of personal transportation.”);
CAROL ADAIRE JONES ET AL., HEALTH STATUS AND HEALTH CARE ACCESS
OF FARM AND RURAL POPULATIONS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.
7–9 (2009), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/155453/eib57_1_.pdf.

50.

JONES ET AL., supra note 49, at 5.

51.

AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH DISPARITIES REPORT 239 (2011),
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr11/nhdr11.pdf.

52.

Healthcare Research and Quality Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299 (2006).

53.

AHRQ, supra note 51, at 234. Other priority populations include racial and
ethnic minorities, low-income groups, women, children, older adults, and
“[i]ndividuals with special health needs, including individuals with
disabilities and individuals who need chronic care or end-of-life care.” Id.

54.

ROGER A. ROSENBLATT ET AL., WWAMI RURAL HEALTH RES. CTR., THE
FUTURE OF FAMILY MEDICINE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL PRIMARY CARE
PHYSICIAN SUPPLY 6 (2010), available at http://depts.washington.edu/
uwrhrc/uploads/RHRC_FR125_Rosenblatt.pdf.

55.

AHRQ, supra note 51, at 61.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 9.
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B.

Designation as an Underserved Rural Area

In recent years, there has been some debate as to how to define the
term “rural.”58 The Economic Research Service in the U.S. Department
of Agriculture has identified nine definitions of rural used for different
purposes.59 The criteria used by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Office
of Management and Budget laid the foundation for definitions of rural
commonly used for health programs.60 Specifically, the U.S. Census
Bureau identifies Urbanized Areas (of 50,000 or more people) and Urban
Clusters (of 2,500 to 50,000) and then defines “rural” as “encompass[ing]
all population, housing, and territory not included with [Urbanized
Areas or Urban Clusters].”61 The Office of Management and Budget, on
the other hand, groups more populous areas as either “metropolitan
statistical areas” (areas with at least one urbanized area of at least
50,000)62 or “micropolitan statistical areas (areas with at least one urban
cluster of 10,000 to 50,000),63 with all less populous areas referred to as
“outside core based statistical areas.”64
For rural health care providers, the more significant issue is the
debate over various methodologies used to designate which providers
qualify for special federal assistance for providing care to underserved
areas or populations. As explained below, such programs generally require
designation as either a Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) or
Medically Underserved Area or Population (MUA/P). What follows is a
brief overview of the criteria used for each of these designations and a look
at current proposals to change the criteria and methodologies for these
designations.
One of the most commonly used designations is for HPSAs. Formerly
termed “Health Manpower Shortage Areas,” the designation was created
58.

See John Cromartie & Shawn Bucholtz, Defining the “Rural” in Rural
America,
AMBER
WAVES,
June
2008,
at
28–29,
http://webarchives.cdlib.org/sw1vh5dg3r/http://ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/
June08/PDF/RuralAmerica.pdf.

59.

See Rural Definitions: Data Documentation and Methods, USDA
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
rural-definitions/data-documentation-and-methods.aspx (last updated July
5, 2012).

60.

See Defining the Rural Population, HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/
ruralhealth/policy/definition_of_rural.html (last visited May 14, 2013)
(identifying these two agencies’ definitions as the “two major definitions of
‘rural’ that the Federal government uses”).

61.

Urban Area Criteria for 2010 Census, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,030, 53,039 (Aug. 24,
2011).

62.

2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical
Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246, 37,252 (June 28, 2010).

63.

Id.

64.

Id.
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under the Health Professionals Educational Assistance Act of 1976.65
This designation has its roots in the National Health Services Corps
program and was originally created to assess eligibility for programs
intended to recruit health professionals to underserved areas.66 Although
the use of the word “area” in the term “HPSA” tends to imply a
geographically based definition, the HPSA designation may be given to
geographic areas, specific population groups, or specific public or
nonprofit provider facilities.67 There are also separate HPSA designations
for various types of professionals: primary care, dental care, mental
health care, vision care, podiatric care, and pharmacy.68 As such, there
are different HPSA designation criteria depending on what is receiving
the designation (a geographic area, population, or facility) or the types
of professional for which there is a shortage.
For example, a geographic area meets the definition of a primary
medical care HPSA if: (1) there is a “rational area[] for the delivery of
primary medical care services,”69 (2) the population in the area has a
full-time equivalent primary care physician ratio of least 3500:1,70 and
(3) primary care professionals in contiguous areas are “excessively
distant, overutilized or inaccessible.”71 A primary care HPSA designation
for a population group, however, generally requires that the members of
the population group (1) live in an area that is “rational for delivery of
65.

Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 332(a)(1), 90 Stat. 2243, 2270 (1976).

66.

Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on the Designation of Medically
Underserved Populations and Health Professional Shortage Areas, Final
Report to the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 21
(Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.hrsa.gov/advisorycommittees/shortage/
nrmcfinalreport.pdf [hereinafter NRMC] (“[T]he HPSA designation process
. . . is statutorily tied to the National Health Service Corps program, the
Federal program that offers recruitment incentives, in the form of
scholarship and loan repayment support, to health professionals committed
to providing care in areas with health professional shortages.”).

67.

See 42 U.S.C. § 254e(a)(1) (2011) (defining “health professional shortage
area” under the Public Health Services Act to include “an urban or rural
area . . . , a population group which the Secretary determines has such a
shortage, or a public or nonprofit private medical facility”); see also 42
C.F.R. § 5.1 (2012) (“These regulations establish criteria and procedures
for the designation of geographic areas, population groups, medical
facilities, and other public facilities, in the States, as health professional(s)
shortage areas.”).

68.

See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 5 apps. A–E, G (2012).

69.

42 C.F.R. § 5 app. A, pt. I.B.1 (2012).

70.

See id. at pt. I.D.1. The area also meets this physician ratio criterion if the
area has a full-time equivalent primary care physician to population ratio
of greater than 3000:1 and an “unusually high need [for primary care
services] or insufficient capacity [of existing primary care providers].” Id. at
pt. I.D.2.

71.

Id. at pt. I.A.6.
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primary care medical care,” (2) have barriers to care access, possibly
including “economic, linguistic, cultural or architectural” factors, and (3)
have a primary-care-physician-to-population ratio of less than 3,000:1.72
Finally, such primary care HPSA designation for facilities applies to
certain correctional institutions73 and public or nonprofit medical
facilities that serve a HPSA geographic area or population and have
“insufficient capacity to meet the primary care needs of that area or
population group.”74
The HPSA designation criteria for other types of health professionals
follow a similar model, although the specific requirements differ.75 As
such, certain areas or populations may be a designated HPSA for one or
multiple types of health professionals. In August 2012, HRSA reported
that there were 54.4 million people living in 5,721 different primary care
HPSAs. In contrast, there were 43.3 million people living in 4,405 dental
HPSAs and 87.1 million people living in 3,689 mental health HPSAs. A
total of nearly 30,000 additional primary care, dental, and mental health
professionals would need to begin practicing in these areas to fully
address this workforce shortage.76
Other federal programs base eligibility on what are commonly referred to as medically underserved area or populations (MUA/Ps).77 This
designation is generally used for clinics and health centers that qualify

72.

Id. at pt. II.A.1.

73.

See id. at pt. III.A.

74.

Id. at pt. III.B.1.

75.

For example, the geographic HPSA designation for dental care
professionals requires a higher full-time-equivalent dentist ratio of 5000:1.
See 42 C.F.R. § 5 app. B, pt. I.D.1 (2012). In contrast, for mental health
professionals, the geographic HPSA designation applies different ratios
depending on the specific type of mental health professional. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 5 app. C, pt. I.A.2 (2012).

76.

HRSA has identified the need for an additional 5848 primary care
providers, 4585 dental providers, and 3802 mental health providers to meet
the needs of each of these respective HPSAs. Shortage Designation: Health
Professional Shortage Areas & Medically Underserved Areas/Populations,
HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/shortage (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).

77.

The term MUA/P encompasses two separate designations contained in the
same regulation. See 42 C.F.R. § 51c.102(e) (2011). MUAs are designated
by the Secretary after consideration of factors including the available resources,
health indices, and economic factors. Id. § 51c.102(e)(1)–(3). MUP, on the
other hand, is used to refer to “the population of an urban or rural area
designated by the Secretary as an area with a shortage of personal health
services or a population group designated by the Secretary as having a
shortage of such services.” Id. § 51c.102(e). See also NRMC, supra note 66,
at 16 (using MUA in reference to “the entire population of a geographic
area” and using MUP “only based on the members of the underserved
population”).
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for federal assistance.78 Whereas HPSAs focus on where there is a
shortage of providers, the “MUA and MUP designations target Federal
resources to those areas and populations where individuals have poor
health status, low ability-to-pay, limited availability of primary care
providers, and barriers to accessing primary care.”79 HHS considers the
following four factors in designating MUA/Ps:
(1) Available health resources in relation to size of the area and its
population, including appropriate ratios of primary care physicians
in general or family practice, internal medicine, pediatrics, or
obstetrics and gynecology to population; (2) Health indices for the
population of the area, such as infant mortality rate; (3) Economic
factors affecting the population’s access to health services, such as
percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level;
and (4) Demographic factors affecting the population’s need and
demand for health services, such as percentage of the population
age 65 and over.80

For MUAs, the agency considers these factors in relation to the population as a whole in a given area.81 For MUPs, the agency considers these
factors only in relation to the underserved population of interest.82 In
practice, HHS applies these regulatory provisions using the Index of
Medical Underservice (IMU), with any area or population scoring 62.0 or
less (where zero represents “completely underserved” and 100 represents
“best served”) qualifying as an MUA/P.83
Although the HPSA designation was developed with a focus on
provider recruitment and the MUA/P was developed with a focus on
underserved populations, there is significant overlap between these
designations.84 Over the last several decades, there have been several
failed efforts by policymakers to create a comprehensive methodology.85

78.

NRMC, supra note 66, at 21.

79.

Id.

80.

42 C.F.R. § 51c.102(e)(1)–(4).

81.

NRMC, supra note 66, at 16.

82.

Id.

83.

Medically Underserved Areas & Populations (MUA/Ps), HRSA,
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/muaps/index.html (last visited July 4,
2013).

84.

NRMC, supra note 66, at 21.

85.

In 1998 and 2008, HRSA issued proposed final rules combining the HPSA
and MUA/P designations. “In both cases, many public comments were
received, and the concerns expressed resulted in a HRSA decision to
reconsider and develop a new proposal to be published at a later date; no
final revised rule as yet been adopted.” Designation of Medically
Underserved Populations and Health Professions Shortage Areas; Intent to
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Under a provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
however, HRSA is directed to undertake negotiated rulemaking86 to
establish “a comprehensive methodology and criteria” for the HPSA and
MUA/P designations.87 In November 2011, HRSA’s Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on the topic issued its final report recommending a
number of changes. While the Committee did not recommend that the
methodologies used for assigning the HPSA and MUA/P designations be
combined,88 it proposed a number of other changes in designation
methodologies. Most significantly, for both the MUA/P and Primary
Care HPSA designations, the Committee proposed including nurse
practitioners, physician assistants, and certified nurse midwives in the
determination of primary care provider-to-population ratios.89 The
Committee also proposed lowering the provider-to-population thresholds
required to qualify as an underserved area90 and increasing emphasis on
patients’ ability to pay in designating MUAs.91
The recommendations in the Committee’s report were approved by a
vote of twenty-one to two (with five members absent).92 As of this
writing, however, HHS has not yet issued an interim or proposed final
rule based on the Committee’s report, and it is unclear whether the

Form Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,167, 26,167
(May 11, 2010).
86.

Negotiated rulemaking is governed by the procedures of the Federal
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570. Under these procedures,
the agency creates a “negotiated rulemaking committee” to draft a
proposed rule, 5 U.S.C. §§ 562(6)–(7), rather than following the more
common notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under the federal
Administrative Procedures Act. See also William Funk, Bargaining
Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of
the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356–58 (1997) (providing a general
overview of the development of negotiated rulemaking).

87.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 5602(a)(1), 124 Stat. 678 (2010).

88.

NRMC, supra note 66, at 21 (“The Committee recommends maintaining
the current distinction between these two major types of
shortage/underservice designations: health professional shortage and health
service shortage. Although the legislative requirements for the two
designation types are similar in many respects, they are rooted in distinct
legislative histories and each has unique practical applications.”).

89.

Id. at 26.

90.

Id. at 32.

91.

Id. at 34–35.

92.

At the outset of the negotiated rulemaking, the Committee defined the
term “consensus” to mean unanimous support. Id. at 7. Accordingly, the
Committee technically failed to reach a consensus in this regard. Id.
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agency will proceed with finalizing the recommended changes.93 The
Committee estimates that approximately 12 million people live in areas
that stand to lose the geographic HPSA designation under the proposed
criteria, with another 20 million living in areas that would gain the
designation. Additionally, 16 million people live in areas that would lose
the MUA designation under the Committee’s proposed criteria, and 48
million live in areas that would be designated as MUAs. Accordingly, if
the HPSA and MUA/P designation methodology is changed according to
the Committee’s recommendations, there could be a substantial shift in
the types of providers that benefit from programs under the new
designations. Specifically, the increased emphasis on ability-to-pay in
designating MUAs may lead to the loss of this designation in areas
where the current designation is based more on a shortage of providers
rather than on a high poverty rate. Similarly, the inclusion of nurse
practitioners, physician assistants, and certified nurse midwives in the
provider-to-population ratio may impact the staffing decisions made by
providers located in geographic HPSAs. As explained below, the MUA/P
and HPSA designations have substantial impacts on a provider’s
eligibility for a variety of federal assistance programs. A rural health
care provider should take measures to ensure the accuracy of any data it
provides that may be used in determining MUA/P or HPSA designations; providing inaccurate data could arguably constitute a false claim
under the FCA.94
C.

Programs, Laws, and Policies Intended to Support the Financial
Viability of Rural Providers

In light of the significant workforce and financial challenges many
rural providers face, Congress and HHS have created a variety of
programs and legal or regulatory exceptions to support rural providers.
An overview of these programs and exceptions serves to highlight the
93.

Under the PPACA, HHS is directed to publish an interim final rule and
then, following a public notice-and-comment period, a final rule. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 5602(g), 124
Stat. 119, 679 (2010). Because the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
failed to reach a technical “consensus,” it is unclear how HHS will proceed
at this point. The PPACA provides that if the Negotiated Rulemaking
Committee is “unlikely to reach . . . consensus . . . the Secretary [of HHS]
may terminate such process and provide for the publication of a rule
through such other methods as the Secretary may provide.” § 5602(e). As
of yet, HHS has apparently not attempted a subsequent rulemaking. See
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on Designation of MUPs and HPSAs,
HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/advisorycommittees/shortage/ (last visited
Apr. 5, 2013) (reporting actions since November 2011).

94.

In such a situation, however, a provider could potentially assert that
designation as an MUA/P or HPSA is not a “condition of payment” where
there is potential FCA liability for making false certifications. See United
States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc., 543 F.3d
1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
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support offered to rural providers and draw attention to how such
programs may give rise to additional FCA concerns.
1.

Rural Health Clinics

In 1977, Congress created a program allowing certain rural providers
to be federally designated as Rural Health Clinics (RHCs).95 In creating
this program, Congress sought to address threats to financial stability
that many rural providers experience, including: difficulty replacing
retiring providers, a disproportionately elderly population, relatively high
operation costs, and a lack of revenue from private, third-party payers.96
A provider who qualifies for designation as a RHC is able to take
advantage of Medicare’s potentially more lucrative cost-based reimbursement methodology.
RHCs obtain their status based on a series of location, personnel,
and service criteria. To qualify as a RHC, a health facility must be
located in a non-urbanized area in which there is an inadequate supply
of health care providers.97 RHCs are required to provide ordinary
primary care service98 and have first response capabilities.99 If a RHC is
not able to provide radiology services or hospital care, the clinic must
arrange for patients to receive these services at another facility.100
Finally, RHCs are required to employ at least one mid-level provider
(such as a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or nurse midwife) who
must staff the RHC at least 50 percent of the time the clinic is open.101
If a provider obtains certification from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) that it is a RHC, it can bill Medicare through
cost-based reimbursement.102 Cost-based reimbursement is calculated by
95.

NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, ISSUE PAPER: RURAL HEALTH CLINICS 1
(2007), available at http://www.ruralhealthweb.org/index.cfm? objectid=
3F504056-1185-6B66-8862A255663EE0E5; see Pub. L. No. 95-210, § 1(c),
91 Stat. 1485, 1485 (amending Section 1861, part B of title XVIII of the
Social Security Act to provide payment for rural health clinic services).

96.

NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 95.

97.

42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(2)(K)–(K)(i) (2006).

98.

Id. § 1395x(aa)(1).

99.

Id. § 1395x(aa)(2)(B).

100. Id. § 1395x(aa)(2)(D).
101. Id. § 1395x(aa)(2)(J). A RHC may obtain a one-year waiver to this
requirement if it can demonstrate that it “has been unable, despite
reasonable efforts, to hire a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or
certified nurse-midwife in the previous 90-day period.” Id.
§ 1395x(aa)(7)(A).
102. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.2462 (2011); OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH POLICY,
HRSA, STARTING A RURAL HEALTH CLINIC—A HOW-TO MANUAL 6-1 to 6-2
(2004), http://www.narhc.org/uploads/pdf/RHCmanual1.pdf (explaining
RHC cost reporting and reimbursement).
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dividing allowable costs (expenses that have an associated maximum
value) by the number of visits made to a RHC.103 HHS has observed that
all-inclusive averages usually amount to more than fee-for-service
payments and that most RHCs see a 25–75 percent increase in revenue
once they become eligible for cost-based reimbursement.104 As such, the
RHC designation is potentially valuable for a clinic in a rural area that
relies heavily on Medicare patients.
One area of concern identified by HHS OIG relates to methodologies
used by CMS to identify rural or underserved areas and populations.105
In a 2005 review of the RHC program, OIG concluded that the methodologies and review processes currently in place allowed for potentially
several hundred RHCs to operate in areas that were not truly underserved rural areas.106 OIG consequently recommended “requiring current
and prospective RHCs to provide additional evidence of community
need.”107 OIG further recommended that CMS be able to “terminate
those clinics that do not meet the basic location requirements unless
they demonstrate that the clinics are essential community providers for
their service areas.”108 OIG’s recommendations focus on the need for
CMS to update its designation criteria and do not suggest concern that
RHCs are currently misrepresenting their status. However, to the extent
that CMS adopts practices requiring many RHCs to show that they “are
essential community providers,” misleading or inaccurate representations
by the provider to assure continued designation as a RHC could potentially be considered a “false claim” under the FCA. Rural providers must
therefore assure that any such representations are not potentially false or
misleading.
2.

Federally Qualified Health Centers and Their Look-Alikes

The Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) program was enacted
and expanded under the 1989 and 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

103. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE CLAIMS
PROCESSING MANUAL § 20.4 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/ Downloads/clm104c09.pdf.
104. OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH POLICY, supra note 102.
105. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., STATUS OF THE RURAL HEALTH CLINIC PROGRAM (2005),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-03-00170.pdf.
106. Id. at 8–9. The report found that 279 RHCs were in areas that were
neither designated as a health shortage area or a non-urban area. Another
946 RHCs in health shortage areas had not been reviewed within the past
three years to determine whether the area should still carry this health
shortage designation. Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. at 17.
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Acts, respectively.109 Although a FQHC may be in an urban or rural
region, the facility must serve a MUA/P.110 The FQHC designation is
only available to public agencies and non-profit corporations that run
under a board of directors.111 A FQHC is required to supply primary care
and make available the following services either onsite or through
arrangements with another facility: emergency care, pharmacy, lab
testing, radiology services, preventative health and dental, transportation, hospital care, and case management.112 Although the qualification
standards are much more complex, the federal assistance available to
rural providers designated as FQHCs is much greater than what is
available to RHCs.
By statutory definition, a FQHC is generally an entity that receives
a grant from (or operates under a facility that receives a grant from) the
federal government under Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act
(PHSA).113 A facility that meets the requirements for receiving such a
grant but does not acquire one is known as an FQHC Look-Alike.114
Apart from the potential for federal grant funding, other benefits for
FQHCs and Look-Alikes include access to discounted prescription drugs
under the Drug Discount pricing program authorized by Section 340 of
the PHSA, eligibility to bring in new personnel associated with the
National Health Service Corps loan repayment program,115 and the

109. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., COMPARISON OF THE RURAL HEALTH CLINIC AND FEDERALLY
QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTER PROGRAMS 7 (2006), available at
http://www.ask.hrsa.gov/downloads/fqhc-rhccomparison.pdf.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id. at 13.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(4)(A)(i) (2006) (defining FQHC as “an entity which
is receiving a grant under section 330 of the Public Health Service Act”).
There are several other types of entities that also meet the definition of
FQHC. Id. § 1395x(aa)(4)(A)(ii)–(D).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(4)(B) (2006). The term “look-alike” is not in the
statutory definition of FQHCs. However, this term is commonly used in
Medicare guidance to describe the types of entities defined in
§ 1395(aa)(4)(B). See, e.g., CMS MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK,
FEDERALLY QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTER, RURAL HEALTH FACT SHEET
SERIES 1 (2012), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/fqhcfactsheet.pdf.
115. NAT’L ASS’N OF CMTY. HEALTH CTRS., SO YOU WANT TO START A HEALTH
CENTER . . . ?: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR STARTING A FEDERALLY QUALIFIED
HEALTH CENTER 2 (2011), https://www.nachc.com/client/documents/
So%20you%20want%20to%20Start-Final%20July%202011.pdf.
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ability to hire a Medicaid eligibility worker with the authority to grant
Medicaid coverage to those who qualify.116
Additionally, any medical malpractice claims against providers working for FQHCs that receive grant funding cannot be brought in state
court.117 Rather, such claims must be filed in federal court under the
Federal Tort Claims Act118 and federal government attorneys will defend
the FQHC at no cost to the FQHC.119 Thus, many health professionals
who work at FQHCs may avoid the expense of carrying malpractice
insurance.120
FQHCs that receive grant funding under the PHSA should be
particularly aware of the potential for FCA claims on the basis of “false
certification.”121 In cases involving a false certification theory, liability “is
predicated upon a false representation of compliance with a federal
statute or regulation or prescribed contractual term.”122 Considering the
potential breadth of these types of claims,123 courts have indicated that a
116. TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS, OUTSTATIONED
ELIGIBILITY WORKERS AT FQHCS: A LOOK AT COST EFFECTIVENESS 2
(2006), http://www.tachc.org/content/Outstationed_Eligibility_Workers_
at_FQHCs.pdf.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), (c) (2011). In order to receive this benefit, the FQHC
must obtain a designation as a “Public Health Service employee” and meet
certain criteria, including implementing appropriate risk-reduction
procedures and verifying the professional credentials of its practitioners. Id.
§ 233(h).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(b).
120. FTCA FAQs, HRSA, http://bphc.hrsa.gov/ftca/about/aboutfaqs.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (noting that “the Health Center FTCA Program
saves health center grantees millions of dollars yearly”).
121. As one commentator has explained, “FCA liability in false certification
cases turns on a finding that the defendant expressly or impliedly certified
compliance with all Medicare and Medicaid rules, regulations and
requirements, but that certification turned out to be false.” Dayna Bowen
Matthew, An Economic Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims Act
Cases on Access to Healthcare for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and InnerCity Poor, 27 AM. J. LEG. MED. 439, 443 (2001); see United States ex rel.
Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is the false
certification of compliance which creates liability.”).
122. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001). The Mikes court
clarified that this type of claim is also referred to as “‘legally false’
certification.” Id. at 697 (citing Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon,
Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance
Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 111–12 (1999),
and distinguishing it from claims “which involve[] an incorrect description
of goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for goods or
services never provided.”).
123. See Monica P. Navarro, Materiality: A Needed Return to Basics in False
Claims Act Liability 8 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (“[T]he need to
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provider’s false certification to the government that it is in compliance
with the law only constitutes an FCA violation if such legal compliance
is an express “condition to governmental payment.”124 For example, in
United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc.,125 a
whistleblower alleged that a health center violated the FCA by falsely
certifying in its annual cost report that it was in compliance with
Medicaid statutes and regulations.126 In Conner, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that such
alleged “false certification” could not form the basis for an FCA claim
because the certification “does not contain language stating that payment
is conditioned on perfect compliance with any particular law or regulation.
Nor does any underlying Medicare statute or regulation provide that
payment is so conditioned.”127
It is unclear, however, to what extent the requirement that the false
certification concern a condition of payment would present a viable
defense to a rural provider, such as an FQHC, that allegedly made false
statements in obtaining funding under the PHSA.128 In United States ex
rel. Parato v. UnaHealth, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that funding for a FQHC under Section
330 of the PHSA was conditioned upon truthful certifications in the

continue to define and circumscribe the purview of the express certification
theory became apparent to the courts, which then began to impose
additional requirements for liability under the theory.”).
124. See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d at 697 (“We join the Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits in ruling that a claim under the
Act is legally false only where a party certifies compliance with a statute or
regulation as a condition to governmental payment.”); see also United
States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372,
1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[F]alse certification of compliance with a statute or
regulation cannot serve as the basis for a qui tam action under the FCA
unless payment is conditioned on that certification.”); United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th
Cir. 1997) (“We agree with the district court that claims for services
rendered in violation of a statute do not necessarily constitute false or
fraudulent claims under the FCA.”).
125. 543 F.3d 1211, 1211 (10th Cir. 2008).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1219; see also Navarro, supra note 123, at 6 (noting that Conner “is
a clear example of the excessive reliance that litigants placed on the
express certification theory.”).
128. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, the analysis applied in Conner is
problematic because the rule regarding what constitutes “a ‘condition to
payment’ for FCA liability, as required by the theory, was left undefined.”
Navarro, supra note 123, at 8.
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grant application.129 The Parato court distinguished Conner by noting
that, unlike the defendant in Conner, “UnaHealth was a grant applicant
for government funds, not a contractor participating in a program to
perform services and then bill the Government for payment . . . .”130 The
Parato court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
because it found that the particular certification on the FQHC application at issue only applied prospectively and the plaintiff’s evidence
related to alleged past noncompliance.131 The significance of Parato is
that false or misleading representations or certifications made on a grant
application may give rise to FCA liability, even where the provider may
have viable defenses in relation to similar representations made on an
application to participate as a Medicare provider. Because FQHCs rely
on this type of grant funding, such providers should be particularly
aware of this area of potential liability.
3.

Critical Access Hospitals

In addition to RHCs and FQHCs, the federal government has also
shown initiative in supporting rural hospitals. The Balanced Budget Act
of 1997 allowed for the establishment of Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs)
in participating states.132 All states except Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have accepted federal funding to
create programs that allow for CAHs to be developed as long as certain
eligibility requirements are met.133
Although states are in charge of creating their own CAH programs,134
a hospital must meet certain requirements to qualify. Specifically, a CAH
facility must be not-for-profit and located in a rural area—defined as
thirty-five miles from any other hospital (or fifteen miles if the area has
more limited accessibility).135 Each facility is also responsible for having
twenty-four-hour emergency services available to serve the area and can
have a maximum of fifteen beds reserved for in-patient use that exceeds
no more than ninety-six hours, or twenty-five beds designated for either
short- or long-term care.136
129. United States v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1796, at *40–41 (M.D. Ga., Jan. 11, 2010).
130. Id. at *19.
131. See United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr., 787 F. Supp.
2d 1329, 1340 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
132. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4201, 111 Stat. 251,
373–74 (1997).
133. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS FACT SHEET 2 (2012),
http://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/downloads/CritAccessHospfctsht.pdf.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(a)–(b) (2006).
135. Id. § 1395i-4(c)(2)(B)(i).
136. Id. § 1395i-4(c)(2)(B)(ii).
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CAHs receive 101 percent of the costs of approved Medicare services,137
including inpatient care, outpatient visits, laboratory tests, and postacute care in a skilled nursing facility.138 In addition to receiving specialized Medicare reimbursement, rural providers who work in CAHs also
receive financial incentives. A physician who works at a CAH in a HPSA
may qualify for bonus pay as an additional percentage of the cost of
treating a Medicare patient. Eligibility continues to increase for CAHs
and more rural hospitals are able to receive the federal support that this
particular program offers. The requirement that the facility be located a
certain distance from a nearby hospital is easily waived, and as of
October 2011, only 65 percent of CAHs actually met the obligation
without a waiver.139
4.

National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Programs

In addition to programs that support rural facilities, the federal government has also created incentives intended to expand the number of
rural health care providers in practice through loan repayment programs.
The National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program offers up
to $60,000 in student loan repayment per health care provider willing to
spend a set amount of time working in a rural region.140 Providers that
work full time for up to two years or part-time for up to four years in the
highest-ranked shortage areas qualify for the most repayment.141 Eligibility
extends to physicians, nurses, physician assistants, dentists, dental
hygienists, and mental health providers in a variety of specialties.142
Repayment programs for providers in HPSAs are set to increase under
the PPACA.143 Beginning in 2010, the federal government allocated $195
million for the Public Health Workforce Loan Repayment program and
by 2015, the National Health Services Corps will receive a funding
increase of over $1.1 billion to help repay provider loans.144

137. Payment Basics: Critical Access Hospitals Payment System, MEDPAC 1,
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_11_
CAH.pdf (last updated Oct. 2011).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. BUREAU OF CLINICIAN RECRUITMENT & SERV., U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS LOAN REPAYMENT
PROGRAM 1 (2013), http://nhsc.hrsa.gov/downloads/lrpataglance.pdf.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 5604
and 5207 124 Stat. 678 (2010).
144. KEITH J. MUELLER, RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: A SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
IMPORTANT TO RURAL HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 5 (2010), available at
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5.

Stark and Anti-Kickback Provisions Impacting Rural Providers

In addition to the various programs discussed above, other health
care fraud and abuse laws and regulations contain exceptions that apply
only to rural providers. By carving out these exceptions, Congress and
regulatory agencies have sought to account for the circumstances under
which rural providers operate.
a.

The Stark Law

The so-called “Stark Law”145 prohibits physicians from referring
Medicare and Medicaid patients for “designated health services” to
entities with which the physician or an immediate family member of the
physician has an ownership, investment, or compensation interest.146 The
purpose of the law is to prevent overutilization caused by a physician’s
financial interest in referring patients for unnecessary services.147 The
Stark Law was enacted in 1989 after a study of Medicare claims from
1987 showed that Medicare patients of physicians with a financial
interest in an independent clinical laboratory “received, on the average,
45 percent more clinical laboratory services than all Medicare patients in
general, regardless of place.”148 The law originally applied only to
referrals by physicians to clinical laboratory services but has expanded
to prohibit interested referrals to providers of other designated health

http://www.public-health.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policypapers/
PPACA%20Rural%20Provision%20Summary.06_08_10.pdf.
145. The law, as originally enacted, is called the “Ethics in Patient Referrals
Act,” Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2137, 2236, but it is
commonly called the “Stark Law” after its sponsor, Democratic
representative Pete Stark from California. The section of the United States
Code containing the law is labeled “Limitation on certain physician
referrals,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, and it is also commonly referred to as the
“physician self-referral law.” See Physician Self-Referral, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-andAbuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/index.html (last updated Mar. 27, 2012).
146. Id. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A).
147. See Susan O. Scheutzow & Steven A. Eisenberg, The Employee Exceptions
to the Anti-Kickback and Stark Laws After Tuomey: What’s a Physician’s
Employer to Do?, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 146, 160 n.21 (2011) (“The
Stark Law’s main purposes are to prevent overutilization by prohibiting a
physician from making a referral for certain services to an entity with
whom the physician has a compensation arrangement or ownership interest
except in certain situations, and to ensure that physicians’ medical
judgments are not compromised by improper financial incentives and are
based solely on the best interests of the patient.”).
148. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, OAI-12-88-01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CONGRESS 18
(1989), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-12-88-01410.pdf.
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services (DHSs).149 The impact of this law is that a physician cannot
invest in an entity offering DHSs and then refer Medicare and Medicaid
patients for such services unless the arrangement falls within one of the
exceptions to the Stark law.150 Although the statute has been amended
to expand the scope of the law,151 the statute and accompanying regulations also provide a number of exceptions for common financial
arrangements in the health arena.152
Although there is no provision exempting rural physicians and DHS
providers from the entire Stark Law, there are various exceptions that
substantially limit the scope of the law in rural areas. Under one of the
most sweeping exceptions, physicians are permitted to make referrals to
DHS entities in which they have ownership interests if the DHS provider
is located in a rural area153 and “substantially all (not less than 75
percent)” of such services are provided to individuals living in the rural
area.154 In other words, the Stark self-referral prohibition does not apply
to a physician making an ownership investment interest in a DHS
provider such as a clinical laboratory and then referring Medicaid and
Medicare patients to it. This rural area exception, however, does not
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6).
150. Although Stark does not prohibit a physician from having an ownership
interest in a DHS provider, “the law makes it impractical to do so in many
situations, by prohibiting certain referrals as well as reimbursement . . . .”
DEAN M. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS
149–50 (3d ed. 2008).
151. David E. Matyas, Fundamentals of Health Law Fraud and Abuse, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 149, 174 (Barry Alexander et al. eds., 5th
ed. 2012) (noting that the law “originally only applied to the provision of
clinical laboratory services”).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(d) (2006) (providing statutory exceptions to
Stark’s self-referral prohibition). The statute’s definition of the term
“referral” puts certain other activities outside the scope the Stark Law. Id.
§ 1395nn(h)(5)(C). Additionally, the statute’s definition of the term
“referral” puts certain other activities outside the scope the Stark Law. See
id. § 1395nn(h)(5)(C). Finally, provisions in HHS regulations interpreting
the Stark Law also carve out various other limited exceptions. See, e.g., 42
C.F.R. § 411.357(t) (2011) (describing a regulatory exception permitting,
under certain circumstances, a hospital to make “[r]etention payments” to
a physician practicing in an underserved area). A full discussion of the
complex array of exceptions to the Stark law is beyond on the scope of this
Article. For a helpful introduction to the topic, see Matyas, supra note
151, at 180–94.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(2). For the purposes of Stark, a rural area is
considered any non-urban area. Id. § 412.62(f)(iii) (2011). In other words,
Stark essentially applies the definition of “rural” used by the Office of
Management and Budget. See What is Rural? Frequently Asked Questions,
RURAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://www.raconline.org/topics/ruraldef/
ruraldeffaq.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
154. 42 C.F.R. § 411.356(c)(1) (2011).
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apply to “compensation” arrangements between a physician and DHS
provider. CMS also carved out a regulatory exception for payments made
directly to physicians by a hospital that provides DHSs to encourage the
physicians to keep their practice in a HPSA.155
b.

The Anti-Kickback Statute

The Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) prohibits “knowingly and willfully”
soliciting, receiving, offering, or paying “any remuneration” in return for
referring or directing patients whose care will be paid for “in whole or in
part under a Federal health care program.”156 Unlike the Stark Law,
which imposes strict liability, the AKS is a criminal statute that requires
knowing and willful conduct. However, HHS regulations have created
various voluntary safe harbors that “protect certain payment and
business practices that could otherwise implicate the AKS from criminal
and civil prosecution.”157 A number of these safe harbors apply specifically
to providers in rural and other underserved areas, thus facilitating a
broader range of financial arrangements for rural providers.
More recently, HHS created a safe harbor that applies to FQHCs,
many of which are located in and serve rural areas.158 Specifically, this
safe harbor excludes from the AKS’s definition of “remuneration” many
“goods, items, services, donations or loans” provided to an FQHC to
support the FQHC’s operations so long as certain criteria are met.159
Significantly, the safe harbor requires that there be a signed, written
agreement, that the amount of the contribution be fixed or set by a fixed
methodology not conditioned on referrals or business generation, that
contribution to the FQHC be “medical or clinical in nature,” and that
the FQHC “reasonably expects the arrangement to contribute meaningfully” to the health center’s mission.160
There are also safe harbors to the AKS related to investments in
health care companies by individuals who may be in a position to refer
or prescribe products or services offered by those companies.161 For some
investments in rural areas, the criteria for the investment to come within
the safe harbor are relaxed. There is a fairly straightforward safe harbor
for investments in large, publicly traded corporations.162 This safe
155. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(t) (2011); see also Matyas, supra note 151, at 188.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2011).
157. OIG ROADMAP, supra note 29, at 4.
158. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(w) (2011).
159. Id. § 1001.952(w)(1)–(9).
160. Id. § 1001.952(w)(1)–(3).
161. See id. § 1001.952(a)
162. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1). In order to fall within this safe harbor, if the entity
invested in has a net worth of greater than $50 million, the investment is a
security registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
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harbor, which applies equally to urban and rural providers, allows for
the common situation of a physician owning a pharmaceutical company’s
stock as part of an investment portfolio without the physician risking
running afoul the AKS. For investment interests in smaller health care
companies, however, HHS created a separate and much more complex
safe harbor. This “small investment interest” safe harbor requires strict
adherence to eight criteria.163 Among these criteria are the requirements
that no more than 40 percent of the investment interest can be held by
investors in a position to generate referrals or business and that no more
than 40 percent of gross revenue can come from referrals or business
generated by investors.164 For providers serving MUAs (including
medically underserved rural areas), up to 50 percent of the investment
interest can be held by such investors and there is no limit to the
percentage of revenue that comes from investor-generated business and
referrals.165 As such, this provision makes it easier for physicians in rural
areas to pool their resources to invest the capital necessary to bring
ancillary services to rural areas.
HHS has also provided a safe harbor for payments by hospitals and
other activities to recruit physicians to practice in HPSAs.166 To come
within this safe harbor, there are nine requirements, including the
execution of a written agreement and that there be no requirements for
the recruited physician to refer patients to the recruiting hospital.167
Another safe harbor exists for obstetrical malpractice insurance subsidies
for practitioners working in HPSAs.168

investment interest is obtained on the same terms and for the same price
as the general public. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1)–(a)(1)(ii).
163. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2). These eight criteria are: (1) no more than 40 percent
of the investment can be held by individuals in a position to generate
referrals or business; (2) the terms of the investment must be the same
regardless of whether or not the investor is in a position to generate
referrals and business; (3) the terms of the investment cannot be tied to
the generation of referrals or business; (4) cannot require investors to
generate referrals; (5) no requirement that an investor market the
company’s items or products; (6) no more than 40 percent of gross revenue
can come from referrals or business generated by investors; (7) the entity
cannot make loans (including loan guarantees) to an investor in a position
to generate referrals or business; and (8) dividends and other payments
must be proportional to the capital each investor has contributed. Id.
§ 1001.952(a)(2)(i)–(viii).
164. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2)(i), (vi).
165. Id. § 1001.952(3)(i)(A).
166. Id. § 1001.952(n).
167. Id. § 1001.952(n)(1)–(9).
168. Id. § 1001.952(o).
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III. Preventing Unilateral Whistleblower Claims
against Certain Rural Providers
As illustrated above, rural health care providers routinely face financial difficulties. To account for the context in which rural providers
operate, policymakers have established programs and legal or regulatory
exceptions specific to rural providers. One area where the law applies
equally to rural providers as other providers, however, is in relation to
claims brought by whistleblowers under the FCA. DOJ policy expressly
directs government attorneys to take into account the impact on a
community’s access to care in determining how or whether to pursue a
civil FCA case.169 This policy does not apply to whistleblowers, who are
free to pursue such cases unilaterally where the government chooses not
to intervene.
From the preceding discussion, several things are clear. First, providers in rural, underserved areas operate in a financially unstable
environment and rely on a variety of federal programs. The expense and
burden of defending what may be a meritless civil FCA claim may
present a substantial difficulty for such providers who are relatively
unsophisticated170 compared to larger organizations in more populous
areas, have slim operating margins, and cannot afford insurance that
clearly covers FCA liability and defense costs. Second, unilateral
whistleblower FCA actions play a very minimal role in recovering
wrongfully obtained government funds from health care providers.
Because of this reality, Congress should consider amending the statute to
permit civil FCA whistleblower claims against rural providers in underserved areas, such as HPSAs and MUA/Ps, to proceed only if the
government intervenes.171
169. Holder, supra note 43.
170. One empirical study found that managers at larger health care
organizations generally found governmental billing compliance guidance
material more understandable. Daniel P. Lorence & Ibrahim Awad
Ibrahim, Identifying Barriers to Billing Compliance, 30 J. HEALTH CARE
FIN. 49, 60 (2003); see also COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH
CARE, QUALITY THROUGH COLLABORATION: THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH
100 (2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11140
(“Traditionally, many rural health administrators have backgrounds in
clinical or technical fields and have learned management skills on the
job.”).
171. This Article focuses primarily on why Congress should amend the FCA in
this regard. However, twenty-eight states currently have state false claims
act under which a whistleblower could bring claims in relation to Medicaid
and other health programs involving state funding. See, e.g, State False
Claims Act Reviews, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
state-false-claims-act-reviews/index.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). States
that enact FCAs that are substantially similar to the federal civil FCA—
including the whistleblower provisions—receive a larger share of
misappropriated Medicaid funds recovered under such statutes. See 42
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This change would have little or no impact on cases where there is
evidence that a provider engaged in egregious conduct,172 as a private
whistleblower with insider information would still have the same opportunity and financial incentives to bring the claim. The only difference is
that such a claim would only be able to move forward if the government’s
attorneys choose to intervene after reviewing the sealed complaint and
conducting an initial investigation.173 In other cases, however, government
attorneys may discover through this early investigation that a whistleblower’s claims are based on a misinterpretation of billing regulations174 or
are simply a disgruntled former employee’s attempt to retaliate against
the defendant.175 In such cases, government attorneys would be able to
U.S.C. § 1396h (2006). This Article’s argument for limiting the scope of
whistleblower provisions against rural providers applies equally to both the
federal FCA and analogous state FCAs.
172. One commentator presents a similar argument in relation to academic
teaching hospitals: “No one could dispute that hardship or not, fraudulent
institutions should be aggressively investigated and relentlessly prosecuted.
However, the internal and social costs of such investigations are high, and
care should be taken so that the mystique of the health care fraud law
enforcement machine does not seduce the regulator into becoming a hunter
when there is no prey.” Bucy, supra note 42, at 50.
173. Several commentators have proposed a similar statutory reform to all cases
brought under the FCA, not just those involving providers in designated
underserved rural areas. See generally J. Randy Beck, The False Claims
Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV.
539, 637–41 (2000); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem
with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical
Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 332–37 (2007).
174. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
in a qui tam FCA outside the health care context, perhaps best summed up
the concern that a qui tam litigant may erroneously interpret “confusion”
about ambiguous regulations as conduct violating the FCA, stating:
Forty years ago Jimi Hendrix trilled his plaintive query: “Is this love,
baby, or is it . . . [just] confusion?” In this False Claims Act case, we face a
similar question involving a mortgage subsidy program initiated in that
era: Is this fraud, or is it . . . just confusion?
U.S. ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 530 F.3d 980,
981 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Renal Care Group,
696 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a Medicare provider did
not act in “reckless disregard” when it “followed industry practice in trying
to sort through ambiguous regulations”).
175. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney
General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244,
1275 (“While qui tam relators are sometimes championed as moralistic
heroes courageously fighting corporate malefactors, FCA opponents paint a
far less flattering portrait. Qui tam’s opponents cast relators as vengeful
former employees who use the FCA as leverage in garden-variety
employment disputes.”).
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prevent the whistleblower from pursuing the claim on their own and
thereby shield the provider from incurring potentially excessive defense
costs. This change would also promote the DOJ’s policy of considering
an underserved rural “community’s interest in access to adequate health
care along with any other relevant concerns” in pursing FCA cases.176
Such an amendment would make the determination of whether or
not to intervene much more significant in cases involving rural providers.
However, it would also provide government attorneys greater ability to
assure continued access to care in underserved areas. In light of the
various programs and regulatory exemptions that apply only to rural
providers in underserved areas, such a change would not be unprecedented. Indeed, the various Stark and AKS exceptions and safe harbors
that apply only to rural providers illustrate how, even in the context of
health care fraud and abuse prevention, policymakers recognize the
context within which rural providers operate. Such a change in the FCA
is analogous to the policy objective of shielding providers at FQHCs
from malpractice liability in state court. As explained above, the HRSA
has stated that shielding FQHCs from such malpractice liability relieves
those facilities from the obligation to purchase malpractice insurance,
thereby freeing up federal grant funds to serve more patients. Similarly,
to the extent that a rural provider’s FCA liability exposure can be
limited to only cases the government deems worth pursuing, additional
federal grant funds and enhanced Medicare payments can be dedicated
to serving patients rather than defending FCA claims.
Such a policy change would add a measure of stability to the financial
insecurity rural providers often confront. Considering how heavily rural
providers rely government programs for funding, such a change may be
particularly beneficial.177 It may increase the relative attractiveness of
rural practice.178 Drawing upon empirical studies investigating how
reimbursement rates impact access to care, one commentator concluded
that “increased costs associated with unpredictable exposure to damages
and litigation costs . . . may have a negative impact on access to
healthcare.”179
As noted above, publicly available DOJ statistics do not specify how
many FCA claims brought in the health arena are against rural provid-

176. Holder, supra note 43.
177. See Matthew, supra note 121, at 462 (“[P]roviders serving the urban and
rural poor are especially at risk of becoming the target of the government’s
fight against fraud due to the large numbers of Medicare and Medicaid
patients who they serve.”).
178. The “little financial reward” associated with practicing in rural areas is
among the causes cited for physician shortages in rural areas. Id. at 461.
179. Id. at 464–65.
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ers,180 and it is unclear how often rural providers are named in such
lawsuits.181 But it is clear from existing data that unilateral whistleblower FCA claims account for a very small proportion of total FCA
recoveries. Considering this situation, requiring the government to
intervene in order for a qui tam action against a rural provider to
proceed would likely have little or no appreciable impact on DOJ and
OIG enforcement efforts. Conversely, such a policy change would by no
means be a silver bullet in addressing access to care shortfalls in rural
areas of the United States. Yet it would add a small measure of additional
security to struggling rural health care providers and prevent the
possibility that one would face a substantial financial hardship.

180. Public access to additional and more specific empirical data would
facilitate an informed analysis as to whether the argument presented here
would detrimentally impact FCA recoveries. As one commentator put it,
“One reason litigation politics have become so dysfunctional in recent
decades is a lack of empirical data that can inform public debate.”
Engstrom, supra note 175, at 1318–19. Although Professor Engstrom
provides an in-depth empirical analysis of qui tam based on a variety of
factors, this analysis focuses primarily on the characteristics of the qui tam
relator and the relator’s attorney; it does not detail characteristics of the
defendant such as health care provider type or size. Id. at 1286–1305.
181. Considering the slim financial resources rural providers often have,
however, even a small number of such cases could have a detrimental
impact on access to care in underserved rural areas.
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